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Abstract 
  Noncooperative network-formation games in oligopolies analyze optimal 
connection structures that emerge when linking represent the appropriation of 
cost-reducing one-way externalities. These models reflect situations where one 
firm access to another firm’s (public or private) information and this last cannot 
refuse it. What would happen if decisions are sequential? A model of 
exogenous Stackelberg leadership is developed and first-mover advantages are 
observed and commented.   
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Networks of collaboration in oligopolies have been empirically found in several industries. Firms make 
alliances for cost-reducing technologies development. Goyal and Joshi (2003) study models of emergence 
of networks of collaboration among firms that compete in quantities (Cournot) and prices (Bertrand). 
They model linking benefits as bidirectional externality that helps both agreement signers to reduce 
production costs. This is the usual modeling option for mutual consent contracts where technical 
information and collaboration are shared. However, the monodirectional (one-way) externality case can 
also be modeled. Billand and Bravard (2004) use Goyal and Joshi’s basic structure but allow only for 
one-way externality flow. This way of modeling externality flow is meaningful for firms that access 
another firms’ cost-reducing public or private information without reciprocity. Optimal topologies found 
are, for the lowest-cost investment infrastructure, complete (Cournot) and star (Bertrand) networks and 
for the highest-cost investment infrastructure the empty network. Cournot market also allows for 
intermediate topologies (see Table 1 for comparing these two papers’ findings). 
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Our paper adds the influence of sequential decision in connections’ structure formation. Suppose a market 
with n firms. Suppose that, exogenously given
3, a firm can move first by establishing links with other 
firms in the market and the n – 1 follower firms observe this and then choose their own connection 
structure. Later on they will compete in quantities or prices. This is the game setting, initially formulated 
by Stackelberg (1934), that we are going to solve and analysis. 
 
Table 1. Optima topologies 
Authors Type  of 
Externality Flow 











•  Empty network. 
Quantity Competition 
(Cournot market) 
•  For highest investment cost: Empty 
network  
•  For intermediate investment cost: 
Firms make connections but neither 
complete nor empty networks are 
observed. 








•  For highest investment cost: Empty 
network  
•  For lowest investment cost: Centered 
sponsored star network 
 
The main results could be summarized as follows. In Stackelberg single-leader-rest-followers quantity 
competition equilibrium, leader firm obtains as least as much benefits as any follower. In Stackelberg 
single-leader-rest-followers price competition equilibrium, leader firm is the only who obtains benefits. 
More specifically, depending on the value fixed investment cost optimum topology varies. If the cost is 
low enough, optimum topology is the complete network (where leader firm connects to every follower 
firm and each follower firm connect to each other and to the leader firm) if there’s quantity competition, 
and the leader-firm-sponsored star network when there’s price competition. If the cost is sufficiently high, 
for both types of competition, optimum topology is the empty network. For intermediate costs, quantity 
                                                 
3 Some academic literature criticizes the exogeneity of leader firm’s selection process, on a priori all-equal firms. 
Some works model role selection in a previous stage of the game where firms could choose whether they are going 
to move first or later. Endogenous models of Stackelberg competition are Amir and Grilo (1999) and van Damme 
and Hurkens (1999). 3 
competition allows for optimum architectures that are neither the empty nor the complete but there are 
connections among firms.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and definitions. Section 3 presents the 




2.1 Framework and model 
We follow Billand and Bravard (2004) modeling. Networks represent in this framework the externality 
benefit of information accessing (technical, technological, legal, marketing, management practices and 
the like). This information allows for firms who initiates and maintains the link to reduce production costs 
by adopting more efficient management practices. When externality flow is asymmetric (technically, by 
using directed graphs), firms who form links access to linked firm information and link formation cannot 
be refused. This modeling approach comprises situations like:  
1.  Access to firms’ public information by 
a.  Surfing competitors’ web sites for acknowledging their products, pricing policies, market 
prestige and the like for benchmarking. 
b.  Analyzing balance sheets of stock exchange’s firms for determining their economic and 
financial performance, 
c.  Consulting the Patent Register for competitors’ new products, 
d.  Reading business magazines that report competitors’ best practices. 
2.  Access to firms’ private information by 
a.  Accessing through illegal ways other firms’ information, like industrial espionage, 
among others. 
 
Next we define concepts to be applied later on. Let  { } 1, , , , , Ni j n = KK  with  3 n ≥ , be the a set of firms. 
For any  , ij N ∈ ,  , 1 ij g =  means that a firm i has formed a direct link with firm j,  , 0 ij g =  in any other 
case. From here, we denote  () ,1 1,0 1,1 , , ,, , ,, ,, ii ii i j i n g gg g gg −+ = KK K  to firm i‘s link vector. 
 
A network  () { } , , ij iNjN gg
∈∈ =  is a formal description of the directed links that exists among firms. Let G 
be the set of directed networks without loops (we suppose that a firm cannot form a link with itself). 4 
 
We suppose that a link  , 1 ij g =  allows firm i to access to j’s information but not viceversa. We focus on 
one way resources flow. Let  ( ) { } , 1 ii j Ng j g ==  be the set of firms j such that i obtains externalities from 
j. Let  () i ng be the cardinal of  ( ) i Ng . We frequently refer to all other firms distinct from i as i’s 
opponents and will be noted as –i. We note   ( ) ( ) ij ij ng n g ≠ − = ∑  as the number of links in the network g 
excluding those links generated by firm i.  ( ) i ng −  can be interpreted as the number of externalities that 
benefits to all other firms except firm i. 
 
We define main network topologies that will be used extensively thru our work. A network g is complete 
if for every pair of firms i and j, there exists a link from i to j. Complete network is denoted as g
c. A 
network g is a center sponsored star if and only if there is a firm i such that i has formed one link with 
every firm j, and every j ≠ i has formed no link at all (Figure 1). Center sponsored star network is denoted 
as g
s. A network g is empty if there is no firm that has formed any link. This network is denoted as g
e. 
 



















2.2 Linking and cost reduction  
We suppose that establishing a link requires a fixed investment cost given by  0 δ > . We suppose that 
firms are initially symmetric with a nonnegative fixed cost γ0 and identical cost functions
4. We consider 
that establishing a link is a way of cost reduction. More specifically, we suppose that firm’s marginal and 
average variable cost of a generic firm iN ∈  has the same functional form: 
 
                () () () 0 gg , ii i cn n γγ =−            (1)                                   
                                                 




0, R γγ + ∈  such that  () 0 1 n γγ >− . A network g induces an average variable cost vector given by 
the following function:  () () () ( ) () ( ) () ( ) () ( ) { } 12 gg , g , , g , , g ii i i i n i cn c n c n c n c n = KK . 
 
2.3 Equilibrium networks 
A network g G ∈  is said to be an equilibrium if, leaving constant the set of link formed by another firms, 
any firm that has a connection to any other firm in g G ∈  has an incentive of keeping that link. Moreover, 
any firm that is not connected to another firm in g G ∈  has no incentive to form a link with this other 
firm. Let g′ be a network where i is the only firm that has the same links in g. 
 
We define  () () () g, g ii i nn − Π  as net benefits of firms iN ∈ . A network g is an equilibrium network, if for 
all i, we have that: 
 
() () () ( ) ( ) () g, g g , g ii i ii i nn n n −− ′ ′ Π≥ Π ,  g G ′ ∀ ∈      (2) 
 
Next we begin with the description of the competition structure. 
 
 
3. Stackelberg networks 
Quantity competition á la Stackelberg is represented by a three stages game. In the first stage, only leader 
firm moves by choosing who to connect with; in the second stage, follower firms observe leader firm 
choice and make their own connection decision. Finally, in the third stage, firms simultaneously compete 
in quantities or prices. As leader firm moves first, it will envisage follower firms’ behavior and maximize 
benefits accordingly by using backward-induction. That will be the solving method for the games to 
come. 
 
Then Stackelberg oligopoly is represented as a three stages game: First, leader firm choose the number of 
firms to link with; second, followers firm observe leader firm connections and establish their own linking 
decisions, and; third, there’s quantity competition. Game timing is a sequential connections game 
following by simultaneous (Cournot) quantity game at the end (Figure 2).   
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Single leader rest followers is a market where two types of firms exist: the leader firm i with ij ≠  that 
for convenience we noted  [ ] 1 i∈  and there exists (n – 1) firms labeled with the j subindex such that  j i ≠  
and  [ ] 2, , j n ∈ K  that we will call the set of followers firms. Two kind of market competition will be 
modeled: quantity and price competition. Next section begins with quantity competition definitions and 
modeling.  
 
3.1 Stackelberg quantity competition 
Let qi be the quantity produced by firm i and p the market price. We model a market with homogeneous 
products and quantity competition. We suppose a linear inverse demand function: 
 
 if 
0 i f  










=  ≥ 
∑ ∑
∑
 , with  0 α >                                  (3) 
 
We suppose that the nonnegative production condition (NPC) ( ) ( ) 0 1 n αγ γ − >−  verifies. Given this 
schema we postulate the following Lemma: 
 
            Lemma 1. Given any network g G ∈  and suppose it is verified (1), (3) and the 
NPC. Suppose a single leader rest followers market with quantity competition. 
Then, Stackelberg leader firm’s reaction function 
*
i q  is 
() () ()








αγ γ γ −+ − −
=
+
. If all the above verifies, 
Stackelberg follower firm’s reaction function 
*
j q  is 
() () ()













Sketch of the Proof: Using (1) and (3) and solving by backward induction the Stackelberg game gives 
leader firm’s reaction function  ()
*
i q ⋅  and follower firm’s reaction function  ( )
*
j q ⋅ . 
 
Equilibrium benefits are defined by: 
 
() () ( ) () () ( ) ( ) ()
2
g, g g, g g ii j i i j i nn q nn n δ
∗ Π= −      ( 4 )  
 
Following this we postulate:  
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that NPC verifies and there is quantity competition among 
firms in a single leader rest followers Stackelberg market. Suppose that it is verified 
(1) and (3). Then, in an equilibrium network g* for the leader firm i, 
() { } 0, 1 i ng n
∗ ∈− . More precisely: 
1.  if 












+ < , then the complete network g
c is the only 
equilibrium network; 











+ > , then the empty network g
e is the only equilibrium 
network; 
3.  if 
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, then in a equilibrium 
network g
*, leader firm i connects in such a way that  ( ) { } g2 , 2 i nn
∗ ∈ − .  
 
Proof: See Appendix I. 
 
For the follower firm case, which works with the analogous benefit function 
() () () () () () () ()
2
g, g g, g g ji j ji j j nn q nn n δ
∗ Π= − , it is established the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose that NPC verifies and there is quantity competition among 
firms in a single leader rest followers Stackelberg market. Suppose also that (1) 
and (3) verify. Then, in an equilibrium network g* for all follower firm j, 
() { } 0, 1 j ng n
∗ ∈− . More precisely: 








+ < , then the complete network g
c  is the only equilibrium 
network; 











+ > , then the empty network g
e  is the only equilibrium 8 
network; 











αγ αγ γ δγ γ
−− + −
++ ∈ , then in an equilibrium network g
* there are 
x firms j,  { } 2, , 2 xn ∈− K , such that  ( ) g1 j nn
∗ = −  and n – x  firms j such 
that  () g0 j n
∗ = .  
 
Sketch of the Proof: It is analogous to Proposition 1 (Appendix I) but with the follower firm’s reaction 
function. 
 
Example 1. We reproduce Example 1 from Billard and Bravard (2004: 598) so we define α = 200, γ0 = 
50, γ = 0.2, n = 100 and δ = 1. Figure 3.a represents benefit surface for a leader and follower firm given 
this initial values and increasing link quantities for both, from 0 to 100. It is shown the exponential 
benefits for leader firm if she does not coordinate with follower firm on initiated links quantities choice.  
 
Figure 3. Benefit surfaces and contour plots (n =100) 






































Leader firm obtains, at least, the same benefits that any follower. If both agree in the number of links to 
be established, both will obtain the same amount of benefits. Disagreement in the numbers of established 
links reports higher benefits to leader firm.  
 
However, an interesting aspect arises. We can present bi-dimensional information of Figure 3.a by 
plotting the functional form contours given the Example 1’s values. This is done in Figures 3.b and 3.c 
where in Figure 3.a contour plots are presented. Axis represents number of formed links by leader 
(horizontal) and follower (vertical) firms and lighter gray scale indicates higher benefits surface and 
darker gray scale represent lower benefits surface. Model supposes that connection infrastructure 
investment cost is exogenous. So, as leader firm moves first she will choose the number of connections 
that would maximizes her benefits. Given Example 1’s data this is observed in  () g i n = 99 (Figure 3.b). In 
the second stage of the game, follower firms will observe this choice and will choose their optimal 
connections’ strategy. This is observed in Figure 3.c in the lighter color contour plot, that is  ( ) g j n = 0. 
This way, these connections’ strategies sustain a leader firm sponsored star network. 
 
Another interesting analysis appears when we sort threshold values of connections infrastructure 
investment costs that determines optimum connections’ infrastructure for both players. So, let 












+ =  be the value of δ to which leader firm (L) decides for embarking in 
complete network g
c connections’ strategy and let 










+ =  be the threshold value that 
determines if leader firm decides to adopt the empty network g




















+ =  be the δ threshold values analogous for the follower firm (F). Next 
we postulate: 
 
Corollary 1. Given the above definitions, δ threshold values for a quantity 
competition Stackelberg market are sorted, form highest to lowest, in the following 
way: 
L FFL




Proof: Trivial.  
 
The interval of sorted threshold values δ let us observe that leader firm values are significantly separated 
between each others. The same range of values for the follower firm strategy choice is narrower. Figure 4 10 
represents a network with one leader and two follower firms over the range of δ threshold values. From 
left to right we depart from the lowest δ value that coincides as best response for leader and follower firm 
for full connectivity among them, which means that g
c (complete network) becomes optimal. However, 
just as the threshold value overcomes 
L
c δ , leader firm has no incentive to play g
c and stops connecting to 
all follower firms. Though, on the interval 
L F
cc δ δδ < < , follower firms still play complete network as best 
response. Just on the interval 
F F
ce δ δδ <<  neither follower nor leader firms have incentives to play 
complete connections so connections exist but are neither complete nor empty. Once 
F
e δ δ > , follower 
firms find optimum to keep themselves disconnected while leader firm still find optimum neither full nor 
empty connections. Finally, when 
L
e δ δ >  g
e topology is the best decision for both. 
 

























It can be noted that leader firm requires for a much larger investment cost for choosing isolation as 
optimal response. Given that, it could be more likely that a leader firm play any form of connections’ 
strategy compared to any follower firm. Under this conjecture, leader firm sponsored star networks would 
emerge as observed optimal response.  
 
3.1.2 Comparing results with Cournot outcomes 
Comparing optimal quantities produced under Cournot or Stackelberg competition usually arises the 
microeconomic interrogative:  how each model’s optimal quantities compare? 
 
Given that both models used the same cost and demand functions, comparison should be direct. As shown 
in specific comparative literature (Dastidar 2004: 559, for a focused description and Vives, 1999 for a 
more general treatment) among classical oligopoly models we should verify that Cournot’s optimal 11 
quantity should be an intermediate value between optimal leader firm quantity and optimal follower firm 
quantity in the Stackelberg case. 
 
We define 
()() () 0 gg
1





∑ =  as firm’s reaction function in Cournot market (see Billand & 
Bravard, 2004), 
()()( ) () 0 g1g
1
ij nn n n S
L n q
αγ γ γ −+ − −
+ =  as leader firm’s reaction function in Stackelberg competition 
and 




αγ γ γ −+ −
+ =  as the analogous follower firm’s reaction function. Effectively we obtain that 
CS
L qq = , while 
SS
F L qq =  if and only if  ( ) ( ) gg ij nn =  given  () () () gg
SS
LS i j qq n n γ −= − . Under 
equilibrium, well identified optimal topologies are the complete and empty network, where in both 
() () gg ij nn =  verifies, leader firm and follower firms coordinate in the number of links established. As 
suggested before, in intermediate network configurations, leader firm will obtain higher benefits that 
under coordination. So if the number of links is uncoordinated it’s better for the leader firm. Under any 
other case, leader firm earns as much as any follower firm. 
 
It is interesting to remember that information is a public good in this setting, so if leader firm connects 
first to any number of firms that do not prevent follower firms to connect using the same or any other 
strategy. 
 
Next, we develop the price competition variant under the Stackelberg setting. 
 
3.2 Stackelberg price competition 
New definitions are required. Let  ( ) D pp α = −  be the market demand function. For price competition 





if  , , with equality for   firms
0 if ,   for  some 
ii j
ii i i j
ij
Dp p p j





   (5) 
Total net benefits for firm i is given by: 
() () () () ( ) ( ) () () g, g g g ii i i i i ii i nn d p p c n n δ − Π= − −       (6) 
 
Game setting remains similar in the first two sequential decisions stages but now in the third competition 
is in prices (it analogous with Figure 3 representation but in the third stage there is price competition). 
What is the optimum price and what topology sustains it?  12 
 
Definitely, leader firm would expects follower firms play Bertrand price on the second stage, so leader 
firm’s manager should anticipate this movement and play accordingly. On the third stage, firms compete 
in prices. 
 
We suppose that demand faced by firm i if it fixes price pi is given by (5). Firm i's total net benefit flows 
are determined by (6). Network equilibrium under price competition in Stackelberg market is given by the 
following lemma: 
 
Lemma 2. Suppose a single leader rest followers Stackelberg market. Suppose that 
(1), (5), (6) and the NPC are verified. In a price competition market, in equilibrium 
there only one firm who establish connections to all the other firms and that unique 
firm is the leader firm. 
 
Proof: See Appendix II. In words, in the first stage leader firm sets a price based on other firms’ 
connections strategy profile. As cost function is decreasing on number of links, prices quickly tend to 
fixed cost. Then, leader firm anticipates follower firms will play Bertrand equilibrium price so she fixes 
the minimum feasible amount and follower firms will be out of the connection market in the second stage. 
 
Once established that by moving first leader firm obtains an advantage, only rests to determine optimum 
market topologies. For that to be accomplished, we postulate the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3.  Suppose that equations (1), (5), (6) and the NCP are verified. 
Suppose that is a price competition Stackelberg market. Then the only firm who 
establish links is the leader firm and for that firm it is verified that: 
1.  if   () 0 δγ α γ >− , the empty network, g
e, is the only equilibrium network; 
2.  if  () 0 δ γα γ <− , the leader-firm sponsored star network, g
s, is the only 
equilibrium network.  
 
Proof: See Appendix II. 
 
Paradoxically there are few examples of Stackelberg price competition models in the economic literature. 
A good exception is Dastidar (2004) who finds out that in duopoly sequential price competition leader 
firm gets a higher market share at a lower price and follower firm gets a smaller market share but a higher 13 
price. In equilibrium, both earn equal profits. Neither leader nor follower firm get advantage under this 
setting. In our case, on the contrary, leader firm gets all. As reflected in Goyal and Joshi (2003), in price 
competition markets competition is so intense that connection’s probability among firms becomes 
smaller. 
 
We end this paper with the conclusions. 
 
4. Conclusions 
To move faster towards getting competitors information could be translated in higher benefits. That 
would be the main finding of this paper. This is another example of first mover advantage (Gal-Or, 1985). 
In this case, firms look for allocate resources in economic intelligence investment. Moving first gives to 
early movers a benefit that could be understood as the benefits of spying the competence. This is 
translated in copying competitors’ best practices that, at the same time, it is transformed in the adoption of 
lower cost production techniques.  
 
It is interesting to note that in our model late movers (followers) are not restricted by early mover choices 
but by the exogenous given cost in connections infrastructure. Connecting firms (spying on them) 
behaves as a public good. If the leader firm connects to any number of followers this will not constraint 
future follower firms choices of connection. This is something that deserves a better modeling as future 
research path. 
 
Finally, leader firm has a wider range of threshold values for adopting optimal topologies. This is another 
advantage that entails greater versatility for leader firm connections’ structure choice.  
 
Other paths of future research comprehends: (i) endogeneizing connections structure’s investment cost for 
dealing with the possibility that firms could modify production structure for adapting themselves in the 
connection market competition; (ii) endogeneizing the process of selecting leader firm role assignment as 
suggested by footnote 3’s quotations.  
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Appendix I. Quantity competition 
Proof of Proposition 3: Demonstration is in three parts. First we show that in an equilibrium network g
*, 
for leader firm i, we have that  (){ }
* g0 , 1 i nn ∈ − .  
 
(1) Let g* be an equilibrium network where at least leader firm i is such that  (){ }
* g2 , 2 i nn ∈− . Let 
suppose that  ()
* g i nk = . We show that if i has no incentive to sever a link, then it has an interest 
in forming a link (and inversely). We know that in an equilibrium network a firm never has an 
incentive for severing a link. So we have that:  ( ) ( ) () ( ) ,g 1 ,g 0 ij i j kn k n
∗∗ Π −Π − > , that is   




22 1 2 1 g
1 0
j kn n n
n n
αγ γ γ γδ
−+− −−
+ −>, and then 




22 1 2 1 g
1
j kn n n
n n
αγ γ γ δγ
−+− −−
+ < =  A. In the same 
manner, in an equilibrium network a firm never has incentives to form new links. That is to say 
that,  () () ( ) () ,g 1 ,g 0 ij i j kn k n
∗∗ Π− Π + > , that is 




21 2 2 1 g
1 0
j nk n n n n
n
γα γ γ γ γ
δ
− + ++− +
+ +> and then 




22 1 2 1 g
1
j nk n n
n n
αγ γ γ δγ
−+ + −−











+ −= − <. Then, if a leader firm i has formed k links such that  { } 2, , kn ∈ K  then 
is never in equilibrium. In equilibrium, a leader firm forms none or n – 1 links with its followers.  15 
(2) This is a two parts demonstration. In the first part we are going to see that a firm once has formed 











+ <  
then g
c is an equilibrium network and in 2.b we show that there’s no other network that could be 
an equilibrium network. 
a) A leader firm has no incentives in sever link under complete network g
c configuration. Then we 
have to probe that:  () () () ( )
22 1, 1 1 , 1 0 ii nn nk n Π− − − Π− − − > . In fact we arrive to 











−− ++ +− −
+ −> which verifes that 





22 1 8 1
1
nn n n k n
n n
α γγ γ γ γ
δγ
−+ −+ − −
+ < . If this 
inequality verifies for  1 kn = −  then it verifies for all k. So we have that 












+ < . This result will be necessary next. 
b)  We show now that an equilibrium network g ≠ g
c is not an equilibrium network. In (1) we proved 
that in equilibrium a leader firm form link with all or none of the follower firms. For confirming 
this outcome, we are going to prove if there’s is a chance that a leader firm could establish 
connections with every firm less one or may be with a cluster of firms and this would be an 
equilibrium outcome. We establish that a contradiction by supposing that there exists an 
equilibrium network g
* such that the leader firm establish no contacts. As it is an equilibrium 
network it should be check that:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
** 0, g , g 0 ij ij nk n Π −Π > , or what is the same 











+ > . Then, there is a configuration nj (g
*) such that a leader firm i has no 
incentives of forming any links with the follower firms whatever their connections’ structure. So 
we could have that: 












+ > , that is a contradiction with (2.a). 
(3) Finally, we show that network g











+ > . We prove first that if g
e is an equilibrium then, in the second part, there’s no 
other equilibrium network. 
a)  First we establish that any firm has incentive to form links in g
e. Then we have that: 











+ > . If this result verifies for 
1 kn =−  then it is verified for all k. We obtain that 










+ > .  
b)  Now we demonstrate that there’s no other equilibrium than the empty network g
e when it emerges 
as an optimum topology. We have proved in the first part that a network g where exists a leader 16 
firm i such that  { } (g) 0, 1 i nn ∉−  cannot be an equilibrium network. Then we must prove that a 
network g, where exists at least one firm i such that  (g) 1 i nn = −  is not an equilibrium network. 
For establishing a contradiction, let suppose that an equilibrium network, g
*, where there is at one 
firm i such that  (g ) 1 i nn
∗ =− . We have that  ( ) ( ) () ( ) 1, g 0, g 0 ij i j nn n
∗∗ Π −− Π > , which verifies 
that 






















+ < . 
Contradiction.  
 
Appendix II. Price competition 
 
Proof of Lemma 2.  
A. Backward induction first stage  
We begin by presenting the following lemma:  
            Lemma AII.1. (Billand & Bravard, 2004: 601) In equilibrium, there’s at least 
one follower firma that form links.  
 
Proof del Lemma AII.1: We establish a contradiction by supposing that there exists an equilibrium 
network where two (follower) firms j1 and j2 has formed links such that  { } 12 ,2 , , j jn ∈ K . Let suppose 
that  () ()
21 gg jj nn ≥  verifies. Given now that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22 11 gg jj jj cn cn ≤ , j1’s brute benefit is null given that 
11 0 jj p n γγ =−  in equilibrium. For that, we obtain as net benefit’s main component is 
1 j n δ : 
() () () {} 12 11 2 1 2 \ , g, g jNj jj j j j nn g δ ∈ Π= − ∑  
Given that firm j2 has a variable cost  ( ) ( )
22 0 g jj cn γ < , firm j1 should not produce anything if it has no 
formed any link. Therefore we have  
() ()
12 0, g 0 jj n Π=  
It follows that 
  () () () ( ) () {} 12 12 1 1 2 1 2 \ , 0, g g , g 0 jNj jj j j j j j nn n g δ ∈ Π− Π = > ∑  
given that we have supposed that  {} 12 12 \ , 1 jNj jj g ∈ ≥ ∑ . This is a contradiction. Specifically for own setting, 
in equilibrium we have that in Stackelberg game’s second stage only one follower firm will establish 
links, while the rest of follower firms will not establish any links.  
 17 
Let ξ be the lowest feasible monetary denomination, which we suppose that converges to zero. Then we 
establish the price this firm would set in the market. 
 
           Lemma AII.2. (Billand & Bravard, 2004: 601) Suppose there is one and only 
one firm in the market (say firm l) that forms links. Then the Bertrand 
equilibrium price is given by  0 l p γ ξ = − . 
 
For our case we suppose that l is such that  { } 2, , ln ∈ K , i.e., it is part of the set of follower firms which 
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which means that if follower firm sets a lower price than any other firm j she will supply all the demand 
alone. If she sets an equal price that any other firm j, they will equally shared the demand and if she sets 
price higher than j’s then she will no supply anything. For that if firm l is the only one that has formed 
link then she has the lowest marginal cost then she sets price in  0 l p γ ξ = −  so to displace the rest of the 
firms of the market. So, there will be  3 n−  firms that will not establish any link while one of them, 
conventionally denoted as firm l will form links with all the others follower firms and the leader firm by 
setting a price a bit lower to fixed cost  0 γ . 
 
How leader firm would react to that? Given that l has set a price  0 l p γ ξ = − , i will play again and would 
set a price a bit even lower given that there would be only one firm establishing links. Using the same line 
of reasoning as Lemma AII.1 and AII.2, there would be only one firm forming link and that firm will set 
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leader firm must decide if she will match firm l’s price or if she will cut the price. If she matches pl given 
the model’s demand rationing rule they will share demand with l. If she cuts the price they will earn 
positive profits. The same would happens if leader firm cut the price by another lowest feasible monetary 18 
unit, ξ, being the leader new price set in  0 2 i p γ ξ = − . Let find out which decision brings more benefits to 
leader firm: 
() ( ) () ()
() () ( ) () 2 gg 0
i dp
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2 gg
22 g g 0
l i i i ii ii
ii
p p dp dp cn cn
nn αγ ξγ ξγ γ αγ ξγ ξγ γ
  
   −+ −−+ − −+ − −+ ≥      
  
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  ()( ) ( ) () () () 0
1
g3 3 7 g 30
2
ii nn γα ξ ξ α ξ γ ξγ −+ +− + ≥  
Given that ξ → 0, then we have that  ( )( )
1
0 2 g0 i n γα γ − ≥ , which verifies for all feasible values of the 
game. So, leader firm will set  0 2 i p γ ξ =−. Under certain functional forms of D (p), price elasticity could 
play a different role in this interpretation. 
 
B. Backward induction second stage 
In the second stage, follower firms will watch the price set by leader firm and they will set their own 
optimal price. But they will find that  ( ) 0 jj dp=  given that  00 2 ji pp γξ γ ξ − =>=− then for avoiding 
losses associated with  () () () ( ) g, g g ji j j nn n δ Π= −  they will choose  ( ) g0 j n = .  
 
Proof of Proposition 3. Leader firm’s benefit maximization will be determined by 
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which is the same that: 






















=− + −  
and given that  0 ξ → , we have that 
() 0 δ γα γ =− . 
 
As in Billand & Bravard (2004: 608) here we can distinguish two cases: 19 
1.  If  () 0 δγ α γ >−  benefits function  ( ) ( ) ( )
** g, g ii j nn Π  would be decreasing in  ( )
* g i n , which 
implies that leader firm will not have incentives to form links. Leader firm remains isolated and 
optimal market topology will be the empty network. 
2.  If  () 0 δγ α γ <−  then benefits function  ( ) ( ) ( )
** g, g ii j nn Π  would be increasing in  ( )
* g i n , 
which implies that leader firm would have higher incentives to form links. Leader firm 
will connect to all follower firms and optimal market topology will be leader firm 
sponsored star network.  